regards-citoyens

.../... (On Change in the Mediterranean, by Dimitar Bechev and Isabel Schäfer (1))

Who are the agents of change?

Looking at the region at hand, one notes the great variety and diversity of agents. Country-based, subnational, local, segmental, social class, political cultural and other differences and specificities all account for heterogeneity. Such agents might push for democracy by promoting civic rights and challenging regimes, e.g. over political expression or the lack of just access to resources.

Agents of change can be elite actors, intellectuals, artists, media, mudawen (bloggers) ; individual activists but also broader societal groups such as (lower) middle class businessmen, civil campaigners as the members of  Kefaya, migrants, youth; political parties, foundations, thinktanks but also trade unions or broader social movements.

What matters is the demand for good governance and political representation, in that such agents transmission and voice the dissatisfaction of broader groups in society into the political arena. In that respect, agents of change are not necessarily coterminous with the NGO scene in the countries in question. They can also be governmental actors embracing reform. In any case, distinctions should always be taken cum grano salis. Even ‘classical’ actors such trade unions, are sometimes state controlled in some Arab countries. That is why NGOs and, significantly, non-violent (mainstream) Islamist movements increasingly take the role of a mouthpiece for citizens’ concerns and engage in social welfare issues.

Islamists deliberate extensively whether they should participate within established political systems or rather stay without (see Nahed Ezzeldeen’s paper below). Even if Islamist actors are unlikely to embrace liberal values, they are, too, definable as agents of change, in the sense that in most Middle Eastern and North African countries they represent one of the rare ideological alternatives to the regime (Burgat, 1995, 2007). The prominence of Islamists has to do with the weakness of liberal opposition movements suffering from internal divisions and narrow societal appeal. Islamists fill an ideological gap, at least on the discursive level. On the one hand, in most of the Arab countries, Islamists represent the needs of the vulnerable parts of society and they contribute to social change. On the other hand, most of these movements take a (ultra-)conservative stance on social and cultural issues such as women’s rights and homosexuality. Thus Islamists are simultaneously agents of change and status quo player, depending on the domain in question. On the other side of the political spectrum, liberal or progressive agents of change fight for equal rights and freedom of ways of life. Some opposition movements have opened a little more political space, be it in Lebanon, Algeria or Egypt. Most of these groups, whether of Islamist or secular background, share one common, overarching cause : the struggle for rule of law.

Turning to leadership, will the next generation of potential leaders in North Africa and the Middle East be agents of change? In Egypt, Hosni Moubarak’s son, Gamal (46), is being groomed for succession in the presidency; in Tunisia, it is Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s son-in-law Sakher el-Materi (30), and in Libya, Muammar Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam (38). Will hereditary autocrats opt for political and economic reforms or will they defend family and clan interests ?

Leadership renewal in Morocco, Jordan and Syria in 1999 was quickly followed by disillusion owing to the limited scope and sluggish speed of ensuing change. Today, legitimate political leaders commanding society’s sympathy is rather exceptional across the region.

International and transnational actors – governments, international institutions, transnational civil society, migrant networks, diasporas etc. - comprise yet another cluster of agents. External incentive such as the privileged/advanced status or even the prospect of membership in the EU may drive political and economic transformation, although the causal

relationship is, alas, not always working. North-South co-operation by civil societies might help, too. However, the hitherto experience of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean is very different from that of Eastern Europe or Latin America when it comes to outside linkages and anchors.

Regional organizations (such as the African Union, Arab Maghreb Union, Arab League, Organization of Islamic Conference) play a marginal role. Outstanding border issues hinder regional integration and economic exchanges between local countries remain difficult, although the informal market is growing. Democratic change largely depends on the economic situation in a given country, or at least, a positive economic situation underwritten by international institutional webs can help political liberalization and the empowerment of agents of change.

Migrants play a crucial role here because, as Mehdi Lahlou argues, they channel values, ideas and new impetus to the host countries and make a positive contribution to transformation. The number of bi-nationals, individuals with a migrant background from Arab countries, Turkey and Israel living in western Europe, characterized by ‘hybrid identities’ (Foroutan and Schäfer, 2009), is actually estimated at 20 million and growing. This means that further research should be done to investigate the role of those groups as catalysts and immediate drivers of transformation.

Do agents of change make a difference ?

Democratization and economic development are largely stalled across the Arab world. The factors are well-known and need not be repeated here – from the outstanding conflicts to the persistence of authoritarian structures and the entrenchment of rentier economies. Facing such structural constraints, actors have limited options but to be co-opted. The capacity for mobilization and civic action is limited. Conformism and lack of prospects is a problem for minorities and different-minded people, but most of all for the younger generations, who grew up with the discrepancies between the external world presented and accessible via satellite TV and the new media on the one hand, and the stagnating local moral norms and standards on the other.

However, it is important not to understate the transformative potential of such agents. Despite the somber views expressed by the world’s commentariat or substantiated by the plethora of governance indices, this collective work suggests that change does take place. As we observe in Egypt and now, even more significantly, in Iran, public criticism of leaders, be it by individuals, ad hoc groups or organized movements, exemplifies demand for democracy and rights across the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (Schäfer and Henry, 2009). The emergence of new constituencies for change results from the exposure to globalization with the expanding flow of goods, services, information and ideas across state borders. In countries like Egypt, two decades of economic reform have produced new middle classes and employees in the private sector, who are not directly dependent for their welfare on the otherwise omnipresent state. If one believes in

historical parallels then the cases of Spain in the 1960s and Turkey in the 1980s where economic transformations set the scene for political change spring to mind, although the experience of A long-term research project on Hybrid Euro-Muslim Identity Models and the role of ‘hybrid’ migrants as agents of change is currently being conducted at the Humboldt University Berlin, cf. www.heymat.hu-berlin.de.

Tunisia since it embarked on economic restructuring in 1987 serve as a salutary reminder that the linkage might not work. While reinforcing social differentiation greater economic openness has fallen short of creating alternative power centres or challenger elites (Kienle, 2005; Boubekeur in this dossier).

Technological change associated with globalization has had a more direct effect on the political process. Websites and blogs have rendered the public sphere more diverse and politically engaged breathing life into civil society, in contrast to ‘old’ media such as TV and the press (cf. Mohsen-Finan, 2009). As recent showcase trials in Morocco (followed by royal pardon) suggest the authorities are in position to reassert their control. They could also temporarily ban access to Internet sites such as YouTube as it has also happened in democratically more advanced Turkey. When compared with their past, not with other regions ‘in transition’, societies across the Southern Mediterranean, even in dictatorships such as Syria and Libya, appear more dynamic and receptive to change.

Outline

The papers featured below build on the discussions at a series of academic conferences : Agents of Change in the Mediterranean (Free University of Berlin, 1-4 May 2008/Oxford, 18-19 June 2009) and Mediterranean Unions: Visions and Politics (St Antony’s College, Oxford, 6-7 June 2008). They have formed part of a research project co-piloted by Dimitar Bechev and Isabel Schäfer under the RAMSES2 Network of Excellence of Mediterranean Studies supported by the EC Sixth Framework Programme. As other research initiatives of the EU, the spirit of RAMSES2 has been to promote scholarly exchange across the shores of the Mediterranean, between researchers and universities in the EU and in what bureaucratic language refers to as ‘third countries’. The intention of the academic events and the resulting themed section is to decentre the notion of change in a dual sense: away from the world of ‘high politics’ as well as away from the vantage point of Brussels institutions. This, of course, has been more of a general methodological preference than a rule fixed in stone so both Europe and government agencies appear in the case studies alongside with assorted ‘bottom-up’ agents of change. All three papers investigate how micro-level factors, whether the migrants’ pursuit of welfare and status within local communities in countries of origin and abroad (Lahlou) or indeed business operators’ profitmaking instincts (Boubekeur) drive social agents in their efforts to re-negotiate their autonomy vis-à-vis state institutions. These vivid and rich case studies add empirical flesh to the metaquestions mapped out in the foregoing introduction.

In his contribution, Mehdi Lahlou (INSEA, Rabat) investigates the impact of migration on society and politics in the Maghreb, with a special focus on the Moroccan case. He hypothesizes that transnational migration might have transformative effects in three domains: (1) social change, concerning the empowerment of women, the evolution of work ethics, gains in educational levels, social solidarity; (2) economic change covering the effects of remittances and the transfer of skills; and, perhaps most significantly, (3) political change related to the advancement of democracy and the rule of law. He finds that migrants’ role has been largely limited to the economy but also procures evidence that the involvement of transnational networks in local development projects has actually strengthened the quality of democratic participation at the grass-roots level, particularly in peripheral areas traditionally neglected by the state. At the same time, Lahlou argues, in agreement with much of the literature, that migration from Sub-Saharan Africa transiting the Maghreb en route to Western Europe has led to the tightening of local regimes and reinforcement of heavy-handed authoritarian practices curtailing human rights.

Nahed Ezzeldeen (Cairo University) discusses the politics of protest in Egypt, with a reference to the Kefaya (‘enough!’) movement emerging in 2004. Her paper tackles two main questions : (1) what were the social and historical origins of such a protest movement ? ; (2) what were the effects of Kefaya’s appearance on Egypt’s political scene ? She sees Kefaya in light of multiple past precedents of citizen action, both before and after the 1952 revolution. Ezzeldeen contends that despite the movement’s demise after 2005 it has managed to create a more cohesive opposition to the regime from hitherto disparate social groups and actors while also nurturing a culture of protest. Far from being a success and falling seriously short of overblown initial expectations inside Egypt and abroad, Kefaya’s primary accomplishment has been the broadening of political space for protest and human rights advocacy by citizens as well as the questioning of the regime’s legitimacy. It has also created alliances, albeit temporarily, bridging cleavages related to social class, political values (Muslim Brotherhood vs. the secular opposition), regional divides (Cairo-vs.-provincial governorates), and confession (Muslims vs. Copts). Ezzeldeen furthermore believes that the movement has had a significant demonstration effect on other Arab countries.

Looking at the role business elites in Algerian politics, Amel Boubekeur (Carnegie Middle East Centre) takes a frontal attack against the commonplace notion in the literature that economic liberalization leads, in a deterministic fashion, to democratic and good-governance reform. She studies the transformation of the managerial class of post-independence Algeria’s socialist economy into a full-fledged business elite, starting in the 1980s. In her view, these elite became enmeshed in the clientelist structures centred on the ubiquitous trio of power, the FLN, army and civil services, benefiting from the boon of the hydrocarbon economy. To her, the rising prominence of business figures in the public sphere is reflective, first and foremost, of the authorities’ strategy of diversifying sources of support through co-optation, in the wake of the destructive civil war in the 1990s. However, the paper concludes that, at the end of the day, new economic elites’ political loyalties are at best shifty. Their present support for the status quo does not preclude a re-orientation towards a political regime seen as more acceptable by the public at large, which in turn would legitimize Algerian private business’ increased participation in the circles of power.

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