regards-citoyens

Quelques réflexions émergent de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique autour de la place qu'occupe et/ou que devrait occuper la démocratie dans les stratégies de sécurité des Etats occidentaux.
Ce mouvement touche en particulier les Etats-Unis au moment même où l'administration Obama semble vouloir remettre sa superpuissance en difficulté dans ses nombreuses "aventures" extérieures au centre des processus et des organismes multilatéraux.
Le CSIS - Center for Strategic & International Studies - a publié le 10 mars 2009 un document de Alexander T. J. Lennon intitulé : Democraty in U.S. Security Strategy : From Promotion to Support, qui examine cette question à travers un éclairage lucide, aussi critique que perspectif qui en fait un document de référence.
(cf. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090310_lennon_democracy_web.pdf)
Sa jusfication politique tient en ces quelques lignes :
" The spread of democraty has not traditionnaly been pursued by the United States simply for altruistic reasons or as a blind ideological commitment ; it is a strategy that has sought to enhance U.S. interests. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his most recent book, Second Chance : Three Présidents and the Crisis of American Superpower (p.180), recalled French strategic thinker Raymond Aron's counsel that "the strength of a great power is diminished if it ceases to serve an idea." Without such a supportable idea, countries would not know the ends to which power will be used, balancing against the United States will be inevitable, and U.S. power will inexorably decline. Historically, the United States has pursued democracy promotion as that idea. "
" Yet, recent setbacks warrant reevaluating the place of democracy promotion in U.S. strategy. What role, if any, should democracy have in U.S. security strategy and public diplomacy today ? "
Afin qu'il puisse apprécier la qualité de ce document dont je lui recommande la lecture, je propose au lecteur de prendre connaissance des termes de son executive summary (cf. ci-après).
" Democracy promotion in some form been central to U.S. foreign policy since the country's inception, yet recent setbacks require reevaluating : What role, if any, should democraty have in U.S. security strategy and public diplomacy today ? Extensive interviews with former national security advisers, senior diplomats and policymakers, strategic thinkers, and democracy experts, along with in-depth explorations of alternative strategies by Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, and Michael McFaul, all enhanced by an elite, bipartisan advisory committee, have found the following :
- The consolidation and spread of democracy remain a strategic U.S. interest. Others may cite values, but members of strategic community unequivocally maintain that the consolidation and spread of democracy remain a U.S. strategic interest for multiples reasons, including an enduring belief in the "democratic peace theory" ; that democracies make better decisions and partners for the United States ; and that a role in spreading democracy can help the United States be, and be perceived as, a benevolent global power.
  - "Democracy" should be rehabilitated, not jettisoned. The new administration should affirm that democracies are not defined by elections, but are slow, complex, and indigenous processes, continuously struggling with self-governance, including the United States itself today.
  - More than Iraq, Egypt has shaped the U.S. strategic community's views. The principal recent U.S. strategic mistake is viewed as the loss of credibility from the gap between U.S. rhetoric and public action in places like Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, not launching a democracy crusade into Iraq, which was initially a quest to eliminate WMD.
  - Charges of hypocrisy are inevitable. The United States will face charges of hypocrisy not just because it must balance other strategic interests, but also because its strategy should vary with countries' needs and desires ; U.S. partners ; the amount of U.S. influence ; and the manner (e.g. public or private) to influence others most effectively.
  - Support, do not promote, democracy. Promoting has become synonymous with imposing democracy. U.S. strategy should be patient, humble, cooperative, and pragmatic, and not always active and public. Working side-by-side with other nongovernmental, national, and multilateral actors, the United States should pursue a "democracy support" strategy, invoking the pillars :
      • be a model democracy, including in resolving issues like Guantanamo and torture ;
      • rebuild credibility by pragmatically and explicity acknowledging that U.S. strategies, tailored for the different countries and regions, as well as U.S. interests will vary ;
      • enhance political assistance to reduce corruption, absolute poverty, and help consolidate nascent indigenous efforts, delivering on the promise of democracy and bringing "freedom from want" ;
      • engage autocratic regimes - both friendly and adversarial - and their societies, including democratic forces, through diplomatic and other means to facilitate democratic transitions. "
Au moment où s'engage une très importante réforme de l'Alliance atlantique, l'ensemble des partenaires des Etats Unis doivent s'assurer que la stratégie américaine de sécurité prend effectivement acte de ces recommandations afin de pouvoir statuer, en connaissance de cause, individuellement et collectivement, sur les orientations et les limites qui devront guider la mise en oeuvre concrète du nouveau concept stratégique de l'Alliance qui doit être entreprise dans le cadre de cette réforme.

NB : cet article a fait l'objet d'une première publication sur ce blog le 15 mars 2009.