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The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe offers the EU a valuable multi-lateral mechanism for furthering its CFSP goals, says OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut. But so far it has taken a more unilateral approach.
When the EU published its European Security Strategy in 2003, it set out as the key EU foreign policy objective a rules-based international order with multilateralism as the means to build it. The EU’s strategy document recognised the importance of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for pursuing the Union’s interests. But six years on it is still unclear how that concept has been implemented in the context of today’s wider Europe. It is open to question whether the EU, by opting increasingly for EU-led approaches rather than using more inclusive formats like the OSCE, is undercutting other more inclusive multilateral institutions and wasting opportunities to cooperate with other partners. Brussels may ultimately be making itself vulnerable to the same charges of unilateralism that it once levelled at Moscow and Washington.
Does that matter ? The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has more than taken off in the years since 2003. The European Neighbourhood Policy has been rolled out, a strategy for central Asia has been agreed, the EU has developed a framework for the Black Sea region, and its new Eastern Partnership has just been signed. The EU’s engagement has deepened in the countries of south-eastern Europe and its security and defence policy has seen the deployment of EU-badged operations not only in the western Balkans, but on the border between Ukraine and Moldova and in Georgia, with EU Special Representatives appointed in many of these areas.
In all of these areas, the OSCE has long been involved, both in its conflict management mode and in its promotion of shared values. But implicitly the EU has acted as if it did not need the OSCE, and preferred to set up its own approach. Does this mean that the EU has decided to set the OSCE aside?
The OSCE matters for EU foreign policy for four reasons. The OSCE is a unique forum for permanent political dialogue with EU allies and partners, ranging from the U.S. and Canada to Russia, Norway and Turkey, as well as countries of the wider Europe with which the Union has increasingly close ties through its accession and neighbourhood polices. In other words, the OSCE is the ideal place to connect the dots of the European Union’s CFSP. The EU often has to act alone in pursuit of its interests, but the more it can accomplish in unison with this diverse group of partners, the better. The effort alone of promoting the OSCE’s effectiveness does much to burnish the EU’s multilateralist credentials and so strengthen the legitimacy of its foreign policy initiatives.
The second point is that the OSCE is the repository of a longstanding and ambitious set of commitments spanning democracy, the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and a dense range of politico-military, economic and environmental commitments. The EU of course has at its disposal its own democracy-promotion toolbox, but what the OSCE has to offer is an agreed framework of commitments to which the transitional states on the EU periphery themselves have already subscribed. In addition, it has a sophisticated network of specialised institutions and 18 field operations designed to help participating states meet their commitments. And at election times – among the most delicate moments in the lives of some of these states – OSCE observer missions provide vital monitoring and follow-up assistance.
The third point is that the OSCE is used to working at the coalface of European security, with expertise in the western Balkans, eastern Europe, the south Caucasus and central Asia. A case in point is Kosovo, where the OSCE acts in support of the international community by monitoring and promoting inter-communal dialogue. In central Asia, the OSCE has had a long-standing presence in all of the countries there, and complements the EU’s own efforts. Closer to home, the OSCE has done much to develop the democratic institutions of some of the new EU member states, and of others still pursuing EU accession.
The OSCE is what might be termed an “actor of urgency” to whom the EU can turn for lessening tensions in situations where other forms of engagement have either been blocked or have proven ineffective. This was certainly the case in Georgia last year when the OSCE was able to deploy additional military monitoring officers in the conflict zone almost immediately after the August 2008 hostilities had ceased. This was an important underpinning of the French EU presidency’s actions and since then the EU and the OSCE, along with the UN, have worked together as co-Chairs of the Geneva discussions on security and stability in Georgia.
My fourth point is that the OSCE remains the place where all the big questions of European security are raised and debated by all of the countries that make up the wider Europe. These are questions about the balance between sovereignty and self-determination, about the pursuit of tolerance and about either settling long-standing conflicts or preventing them from flaring anew. The permanent debate within the OSCE’s structures is vibrant, and today’s wider Europe certainly needs such a debate – both as a thermometer and as a safety valve. OSCE is the place for joint positions and common actions to be developed, often despite sharp differences between some of the states concerned. Needless to say, it’s a process that is important for the EU too.
In short, the OSCE has all the capacities needed for it to act as a key forum for the EU and enabling it to coordinate with allies and engage with partners. It is also a useful tool for promoting EU values and interests on the ground. The OSCE can bring the collective weight of 56 states to bear on problems that the EU cannot solve by itself, and on those where it is much more cost-effective for the EU to act in partnership with others. Because the Organization is underpinned by values like strengthening democracy and protecting fundamental freedoms that are intrinsic to the EU and its CFSP, acting through the OSCE is both the right and the smart thing for the EU to do.
But the truth is that the EU could do better when it comes to drawing on the strengths of the OSCE. So far, EU policy toward the Organisation has been incomplete, often characterised by a disconnect between the EU in Brussels and the EU in Vienna. Coordination between the two is in practice sometimes lacking.
What is more, the EU doesn’t make enough of its potential influence within OSCE. Twenty-seven of the OSCE’s 56 participating states are members of the EU. They provide over 70% of the Organization’s budget as well as over 55% of its voluntary funding. They supply close to 70% of all the seconded staff to field operations, the OSCE’s secretariat and institutions, and half of all contracted staff. On top of that, EU countries have more often than not held the chairmanship of OSCE and thus provided its political lifeblood.
Yet, for all this, the EU continues to punch below its weight, generally leaving the political initiative within the OSCE to the United States or Russia. On all too many issues the EU is dragged down by cumbersome positions that dilute the Union’s strength and unity of purpose. But to face today’s new challenges the OSCE needs a strong EU voice. The Helsinki Process of the early 1970s that gave birth to OSCE was one of the first places where European political cooperation was tested and worked, so the message must be that renewed EU engagement is vital.
If the EU is to turn the words of its 2003 European Security Strategy into actions, three outstanding issues need to be addressed.
The first is immediate, and concerns the OSCE’s role in Georgia. No agreement was reached last December on renewing the mandate of the OSCE mission to Georgia. It had been there since 1993 but recently completed its technical closure. All parties agree, though, that the current instability there calls instead for a greater OSCE role on the ground. The current Greek chairmanship of OSCE has been relentless in pursuing talks on a new monitoring, early warning and conflict prevention mandate for the Organization and the EU should itself have a vital interest in a continuing OSCE presence to bolster its own monitoring mission and to underpin its work in the Geneva discussions.
The second issue is that the EU should make the most of the OSCE’s potential for taking forward the idea of a renewed European security dialogue. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s initial proposal for a “pan-European security treaty” reflected a sense of discomfort in Moscow with developments in the politico-military sphere across wider Europe. And while EU member states are understandably hesitant to commit to such a treaty, they should nonetheless welcome the opportunity to engage Russia in constructive dialogue. The OSCE, with its inclusive membership and its comprehensive security concept, is the natural place for such a dialogue. Informally, this dialogue has already started in OSCE, so now the EU should show it has the political will and the vision for developing the dialogue further.
Third and last there is Kazakhstan, which will take over the chair of the OSCE in 2010. This breaks with the recent tradition of EU chairmanships, but announces a new era for the OSCE, with the first post-Soviet chair as well as a new geographical centre of gravity. The Kazakh chairmanship is an opportunity to be seized by the EU as a means for supporting continued political reform in that country and to reinforcing stability in central Asia. To do so, however, the EU must show its own determination to make effective multilateralism more than just a slogan. A stronger OSCE will make the EU stronger too.

Source : www.europesworld.org