regards-citoyens

The ‘National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020’, approved by President Medvedev on 12 May, establishes a new framework for Russia’s security policy. It is based on national strategic priorities in the areas of defence, security of the state and society, and sustainable development. The main changes from the 2000 National Security Concept are a greater emphasis on the need to improve the quality of life of Russia’s citizens and a less hostile attitude towards the US and NATO. The National Security Strategy combines elements of continuity and change, assertiveness and pragmatism strongly influenced by the willingness to ‘reset’ a good relationship with the US in order to overcome the negative effects of last summer’s war in South Ossetia.

This ARI describes the process of reviewing the previous documents on National Security, the new military and non-military threats and the goals and a check-list for assessing the National Security Strategy’s results.

The extent to which sustainable development will be considered in practice a priority area remains to be seen, especially when the state is forced to choose between it and more traditional national security priorities, like military reform, in a context of limited public spending. Consequently, there is a risk that the increased focus on individuals and their living conditions that appears in the Strategy will be forgotten in favour of macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP growth, that do not reflect social inequalities. Furthermore, as with any official document, the Strategy is not only relevant for what it says, but also because of what it does not say. The most significant omission is, of course, the question of democracy and civil society, which are the document’s first long-term national priorities, but which are subsequently barely mentioned.

Russia is now much more self-confident as a great power, thanks to its increased international role, economic development and military potential; that is why a stronger Russia should not perceive the West as a security challenge, but rather as a necessary partner in the fight against global threats, although rivalries will remain in other areas. The challenge for the Kremlin is to overcome the legacies of the past in order to face the real dangers to the country, which are still mostly its own internal weaknesses. However, the limited ability of Russia’s citizens to influence governmental decisions means that any significant change will depend almost exclusively on the ruling elite and, especially, on Medvedev’s authority over the rest of the executive power, including Putin and the siloviki (members of Russia’s so-called ‘power ministries’ –siloviye ministerstva–: Defence, Internal Affairs and the security and intelligence services). As occurred in the past with many well-intentioned policies whose result was very different than expected, this might become one of the instances of what former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said about the post-Soviet economic reform: ‘We wanted to make things better… but it turned out as always’.

For more details : Morales_Russia_New_National_Security_Strategy_Medvedev.pdf