Tel qu’il se présente actuellement le projet de communication de la Commission (« Developing a strong defence industrial base for a secure Europe – A New Deal for European Defence ») ressemble au mieux à une boîte à outils où l’on aurait rangé un peu vite tout ce qu’on pouvait trouver dans différents tiroirs du Berlaymont et qui pouvait avoir un lien ou une utilité pour l’industrie et ou les secteurs de la sécurité et de la défense au sens large. C’est bien, mais cela reste très insuffisant. Cette communication doit avoir une double dimension, politique et stratégique. Elle doit constituer un incitant fort pour une relance de la défense européenne en apportant des réponses concrètes aux chefs d’État ou de gouvernement. Elle doit, comme je le disais dans le dernier numéro d’EDD, fournir le cadre politique qui permettra de déployer une stratégie des moyens pour répondre aux besoins capacitaires de l’Union et de ses États membres et interrompre la spirale infernale du déclassement stratégique.

La question fondamentale qui doit ici nous guider est celle des moyens dont l’Union et ses États membres doivent pouvoir disposer pour faire face aux défis immédiats et potentiels dans le domaine complexe de la sécurité et de la défense. Cette question en entraîne une autre : comment les acquérir, les entretenir et les moderniser ? La question subsidiaire à laquelle nous n’échapperons pas c’est : qui le fait et comment ?

En ayant ces questions à l’esprit et dans l’économie de mots de cette rubrique (autrement dit sans chercher à réécrire le projet de communication que nous connaissons), je privilégierai cinq lignes de force visant à une plus grande efficacité de notre défense commune et de l’économie qui la sous-tend :

1) les capacités. Elles constituent la première priorité à la fois pour reconstituer et adapter les outils de défense et de sécurité des États membres et – sous la forme de programmes – pour préserver et consolider notre base industrielle et technologique. Dans sa forme actuelle, la communication envisage des projets dans le domaine spatial (SatCom, imagerie, observation de l’espace) et l’acquisition de capacités duales (transport stratégique, drones de surveillance, navires hôpitaux). Mais pourquoi se limiter à des équipements aux frontières de la sécurité civile et du domaine militaire ? En brisant un tabou politique, la question doit être posée au Conseil européen de l’utilité d’avancer vers une défense commune et partant, vers des capacités militaires détenues à l’échelle de l’Union pour remplir des missions d’intérêt commun qu’aucun État membre n’est plus en mesure d’assumer seul. A l’heure de choix budgétaires pénibles, ne serait-il pas raisonnable de confier à l’Union, par exemple, la responsabilité de la protection des routes commerciales maritimes et d’offrir ainsi aux marines nationales la possibilité de se concentrer et de gagner en efficacité sur des missions de souveraineté, de projection, voire de dissuasion ?

2) les ressources. Trois sujets essentiels devraient, selon moi, être abordés dans ce volet : (a) les options de financement des capacités susmentionnées et de la recherche ainsi que l’examen des recours possibles aux politiques structurelles et à des financements de la BEI ; (b) la problématique de l’accès aux matières premières et aux terres rares ; (c) l’énergie, la réduction de la consommation (et de l’empreinte environnementale) y compris en opération et l’efficacité énergétique.

3) la recherche et l’innovation. Nos lecteurs savent que cela fait très longtemps que je milite pour une recherche de défense conduite à l’échelle de l’Union et un accroissement de la recherche en coopération. Le verrou juridique contenu dans le projet actuel de programme-cadre doit sauter pour ouvrir la voie à une action préparatoire et au financement de programmes communs à plusieurs États membres, selon les modalités des articles 184 ou 185. Toutes les autres synergies sont évidemment les bienvenues.

4) les marchés. Il s’agit là de l’ensemble des mesures propres à améliorer le fonctionnement du marché intérieur : contrôle rigoureux de l’application des deux directives de 2009 et révision à l’horizon 2016/2017 des dispositions qui posent problème (exemptions dans la directive marchés ; complexité du dispositif de licences, par exemple) ; adoption de normes et de procédures de certification communes ; introduction d’un mécanisme de type « semestre européen » en vue d’aligner les calendriers nationaux de planification des acquisitions et de promouvoir un dialogue réduisant effectivement les trous capacitaires (cette mission relève pour moi fondamentalement de la compétence de l’agence européenne de défense, mais la Commission, eu égard à ce qui précède, devrait aussi y être associée).

5) la base industrielle. L’industrie a beaucoup à gagner de tout ce qui précède et une politique industrielle unique édictée au rond-point Schuman est à mon sens parfaitement illusoire, pour de multiples raisons : l’industrie dont nous parlons recouvre des réalités extrêmement variables du producteur national d’Europe centrale au conglomérat civil et militaire multinational en passant par les PME ; il y a presque autant de stratégies industrielles que d’opérateurs économiques ; la structure de marché limite l’emploi des recettes classiques, même si les effets des politiques de transparence et de concurrence dans le marché intérieur seront bénéfiques à moyen terme. Parmi les pistes à retenir figurent néanmoins : - la recherche d’une meilleure insertion des PME dans le tissu industriel européen ; - la recherche d’une meilleure ouverture des pays tiers (réciprocité) et des formes de soutien à l’exportation ; - l’engagement d’une réflexion collective sur les technologies critiques et les activités industrielles qui méritent d’être considérées comme stratégiques et de bénéficier, en tant que telles, d’une protection à l’échelle de l’Union.

Ceci étant posé, il me semble difficile de conclure sans aborder la dimension institutionnelle de la mise en œuvre d’un tel projet politique. Adopter sous la forme d’une communication une sorte de plan d’action dont la mise en œuvre serait dévolue à une myriade d’unités, la plupart du temps aux effectifs ridicules, parsemées dans diverses directions générales de la Commission serait contreproductif. Deux solutions méritent d’être examinées pour éviter que le soufflé ne retombe au lendemain du Conseil européen. La première correspond de mon point de vue au minimum requis. Elle a l’avantage d’être relativement facile à mettre en œuvre. Il s’agit de réunir dans un même portefeuille au sein de la Commission européenne l’ensemble de ces compétences éparses. Sous l’égide du Haut représentant pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité, vice-président de la Commission et chef de l’agence européenne de défense, ce commissaire à la sécurité et la défense, aurait également pour responsabilité de développer les indispensables synergies avec les différentes composantes du SEAE, au premier rang desquelles l’AED, le comité militaire et l’état-major.

Cette solution à caractère transitoire et à traité constant, ne doit pas nous priver d’envisager quelque chose de plus ambitieux à la veille des élections européennes et alors qu’une révision des traités n’est plus entièrement taboue. S’il en a l’ambition et le courage, le Conseil européen peut engager cette révision, selon la procédure ordinaire, à la majorité simple. Beaucoup de questions militeraient pour la convocation d’une Convention et la révision des traités, à commencer par les réponses à apporter aux questions fondamentales de l’intérêt européen, de la solidarité et de la légitimité de l’emploi de la force, pour pouvoir engager la rédaction d’un véritable concept stratégique européen. Un toilettage des dispositions relatives à la PESC et à la PSDC s’impose également. Nombre d’entre elles sont restées inopérantes ; d’autres se sont avérées inefficaces. Mais revenons au sujet qui nous occupe. Ce qui précède ressemble à s’y méprendre à une politique européenne des capacités et de l’armement prévue par le traité, mais celle-ci ne fait qu’apparaître subrepticement dans une phrase consacrée à l’AED. Le traité ne dit pas en quoi cette politique doit consister et le mandat de l’AED n’en parle pas. Il faut corriger cela en confirmant, pour ces sujets, la Commission dans son rôle d’institution politique exerçant l’initiative et assurant la mise en œuvre des politiques communes. Cela peut se faire sans préjudice des compétences des États membres, en ce qui concerne leurs propres capacités, la planification et la conduite des opérations, etc. Quant à l’agence, elle devrait voir son rôle renforcé dans des tâches d’expertise et de médiation (semestre européen, identification des besoins, évaluation des engagements des États membres) et d’exécution (consolidation de la demande, projets de coopération, etc.)

Est-ce trop demander que de vouloir une saine répartition des rôles et la fin des querelles institutionnelles ? Faire le saut qualitatif que requiert une défense commune ou se résigner au déclin de nos petites capacités nationales, tel est le choix qui se posera au Conseil européen en décembre prochain.

Cet article a été préalablement publié en éditorial du n° 602 d'EUROPE, DIPLOMATIE & DEFENSE - EDD -, en date du 25 avril 2013.

Voir également :

 *  Recommandations pour l'élaboration de la communication de la Commission européenne relative aux enjeux de défense européenne - Première partie -

 * Ce dont l'Union européenne a le plus besoin aujourd'hui, c'est d'une vision stratégique de sa véritable place comme acteur global dans le monde

Thank you very much Congressman, Ambassador. Can I say how delighted I am to be in Washington and to have the opportunity to open the second symposium on the European Union's Security and Defence Policy.

Last year I was very disappointed that I couldn't be with you, so I was extremely pleased that we were able to schedule this at a time when I could be.

The focus of our debates today is about this transatlantic partnership and how we can make it work better for global security.

I recognize, as I begin to speak, that we continue to operate in challenging financial circumstances. Defence is clearly being affected by the economic situation that we all face.Budgets are shrinking. Although total global military spending still exceeds the numbers at the peak of the Cold War, military expenditure as a percentage of total spending has decreased

for the first time since 1998 (by about 0.5 per cent between 2011 and 2012).

In the decade since 2001, the US share of NATO defence expenditure has increased from 63% to 77%. And as the United States begins to look at how to cut back itself—how to re-engineer its defence expenditure—I believe thatEuropeans need to shoulder the burden of our own security.

I've no doubt too that the trend for shrinking budgets is unlikely to be reversed anytime soon.

And at the same time, security challenges are growing. Traditional threats, regional conflicts, fragile states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—those are as relevant and as difficult as ever.

But adding to that are the new threats that have emerged. Look at the effects of climate change, the risk that that creates for, for example, mass migration. What happens in terms of piracy that threatens the disruption of crucial trade routes(particularly a vulnerability for the European Union, as 90% of our trade is conducted by sea); cyber attacks that threaten critical infrastructure; energy grids; hospitals; business; these threats are directly affecting the security and the well-being of all of our citizens.

Like the United States, the European Union is ready to play our part in strong security partnerships that provide security both in our own neighborhood and beyond. We are deeply engaged, and we will remain deeply engaged in a whole range of crisis management issues.

But I maintain that to do this we need to make better use of our resources. Europe's potential is enormous. European Union Member States have strong military industries (a turnover of 94 billion euros in 2010 alone). They spend almost 200 billion euros a year on defence between the Member States of the European Union. And just to put that in perspective, that's more than China, Japan and Russia spend added together.

But we are not making the best use of these considerable resources. No fewer than 23 different types of armoured vehicles with varying calibres of ammunition will be commissioned in Europe in the next 10 years. European armed forces have 7 types of combat helicopters and four types of main battle tanks.

EU Member States armed forces have roughly 3000 jet fighters, but only 40 are capable of refuelling other aircraft in the air.

And that's why one of the main focuses of my job is the coordination and cooperation of our defence capabilities – what we in the European Union call Pooling and Sharing.

We need to make sure that our key capabilities are preserved and that can only be done through cooperation. In plain terms, the choice is this: We either pool it, or we're going to lose it.

There are some good examples, I'm pleased to say, of how we're beginning to pool and share more effectively. The Netherlands and Belgium, for example, no longer do national naval planning. Their navies commission equipment jointly, but retain separate fleets.

The European Defence Agency, which I head, is dedicated to enhancing this capability

development, including through cooperation inResearch and Technology. The EDA is now looking at ways to widen and deepen cooperation on Air-to-Air-Refueling, as well as looking at pioneer projects on Cyber Defence and Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems.

But to be more effective in addressing the security challenges we face, we not only need to spend our money and develop our capabilities better, we need to make sure that we use them as part of a joined-up strategic approach to crises and threats. And that means bringing all of the different aspects of EU action together in what I call the Comprehensive Approach – something which only the European Union as a whole can do, and something which I believe makes us an effective foreign and security partner for our allies such as the United States of America.

By coordinating what we do on security with what we do on development with our diplomatic activity, we can look at the problems in our regions in a long-term, strategic way, making the best use of the resources and maximizing their effectiveness. Working with our strategic partners like the US and international organizations, not least the United Nations, we can address the underlying causes of the security challenges we face as well as dealing with the symptoms.

That was the idea behind the creation in the Lisbon Treaty of my role and the purpose of bringing into being a European External Action Service, which I've designed to try and deliver on these responsibilities. If you like, it's my role to act as the catalyst to make sure that we draw systematically on all of the instruments at our disposal: diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, development, security.

Let me describe what I mean by giving you some real examples.

I want to talk briefly about what we're doing in theHorn of Africa.

In order to try and work out how to effectively support development, in every sense of that word, in the Horn of Africa, we've put together a Joint Strategic Framework. I appointed an EU Special Representative to look after the region. We've trained 3,000 Somali troops (that's about a third of their armed forces personnel), through a mission that we have in Uganda. You've worked in the United States very closely with us on this,providing assistance, for example, in air transport and with financial support.

The troops that we've trained are now the core of the Somali Armed forces. And we've provided, in addition, crucial financing to AMISOM. I have been closely involved in our diplomatic efforts; I went to Mogadishu last August, in order to help support the crucial phase of the transition that we saw take place in that country.

Our mission, which we called EUCAP Nestor, was launched last year to assist Somalia and the countries of the region, in order to help support them to build their own capacity to deal with the challenge of piracy. And what we've seen is piracy decrease by 95% in the past two years, not least because of the work of Operation Atalanta, the mission of the European Union again in collaboration with NATO and forces from across the world, in deterring, preventing, capturing, and leading to the prosecution of pirates at sea.

But we all know there is no room for complacency.And the conference that took place in London yesterday was another component of theEuropean Union strategy, that we believe is about developing a long-term process for Somalia that can ensure that after more than 20 years of civil strife, the country can move forward. And that means working with our development colleagues as the armies move forward and remove the threat of Al Shabaab from different communities in Somalia. The development follows: the building of schools; the provision of jobs; work with local communities to ensure that they don't go backwards; and working with the government to put in place the institutions that they're going to need to be able to be effective as the country goes forward— all of the different tools in operation together.

A second example would be what's happening currently in the Sahel.

Here too we've agreed a strategic framework for the work that we do across the region, working with the ministers of each of the countries, collaboratively and collectively, a strategy that we put in place before the recent crisis in Mali erupted. We also brought forward and launched the training mission in Mali, in response to the urgent needs of the Malian government and the Malian people. And that began to deliver immediately military advice, collaborating very closely, of course, with France on the ground.

The training of the first battalion of the Malian military is underway. 22 of our Member States have contributed people and resources, and more than 2000 soldiers will be trained to provide security in the country.

And that's an example of a place where we are also developing our "joint programming" – where we try and deliver our aid more effectively. Anyone looking at the challenges of the Sahel will see populations, especially in the north of each country, who are disconnected from the south, and who need to have very basic support. The Sahel suffers from hunger, from a lack of development, from a lack of education, from lack of economic opportunities, from security threats and risks. It has a multiplicity of challenges which need to be addressed in a comprehensive way if we're going to be successful, and in which the military operation is absolutely key and crucial in order to be able to support each country individually and the region as a whole.

That's why also we've developed in Niger the capacity through our mission to be able to help them to fight terrorists and organized crime.

And so too when we look at the neighborhood in which the European Union operates, I've often said that Europe should be judged by its effectiveness in its own neighborhood.  t's why it's so important that we've played the crucial role in the work between Serbia and Kosovo, and the implementation teams are meeting today in Brussels to put the political agreement into practical action.

But also when we look at what's happening in our southern neighborhood, countries going through dramatic change, we’ve been looking to find ways in which we can bring together the support that we offer—what I sometimes describe as economics meets politics—in support of building what must be eventually deep democracy.

It means building the institutions that are going to be necessary in countries like Libya where they simply did not exist, embedding the rule of law and good governance, as well as of course, the silver thread of respect for human rights that needs to run throughout. None of this can be done without at the same time pursuing the extremely important economic governance that needs to take place. So we've worked with Tunisia, with Egypt, with Jordan, with all of the countries of our southern neighborhood to try and pull together, collaborating with financial institutions, with parliaments, with others who can provide both economic and political support in order to put in place real plans that can help these countries go through difficult but important transition periods.

Huge amounts of money pulled together through our work, but as importantly, the big challenge of trying to support people who want to see their countries moving to democratic freedom. Anyone looking at the region today can see what those challenges currently are. But everything, from how you secure the borders of Libya, to how you develop an economic plan for Egypt, to how we support Jordan currently going through tremendous challenges with all of the refugees coming through—from Syria, 7000 every day—all of this needs to be done in a comprehensive and effective way.

I mentioned already Serbia and Kosovo, but I just want to return to the Balkans, because here is a wonderful example where the European Union and the United States have worked effectively together. In everything from the talks themselves where the US played an important role, but also, I remember with great affection the joint trip I did with former Secret ay Clinton to the region in October of last year, and the collaboration we've had with NATO in our work in that region too. Good cooperation with EULEX Kosovo and KFOR on the ground—it's so important to see how support for peace and security through the military and through the support for the police, through the building of the judiciary, all of these different elements of how you ensure the rule of law is effective. These are good examples to me of how we develop our approach in a comprehensive and important way.

I would argue too that our Transatlantic Partnership is key to everything we do in security and defence. The interests that we saw last year in this workshop and again this year shows to me the importance of this mutual interest in this field.Like no two other partners in the world, we share the same values; we share the same interests.

Last year we signed with the United States the agreement to allow US participation in EU missions. It was a really important step forward because now we can invite the United States to join with us. You've engaged with our training mission in Somalia. You deployed with us in the Congo. And you make a crucial contribution, as I've indicated, to the work we're doing in EULEX Kosovo.

I really want to see how we can enhance that cooperation further – including, by the way, in the UN framework. We give, in the European Union, about 40% of funding to UN Peace Keeping; theUnited States gives 30%. So together, we give 70%. I think we should use that to make sure that we closely coordinate all of our policies in this regard.

I want to say a little bit too about the relationship with NATO which I've eluded to. The breadth of what we can do in the European Union can be usefully combined with the depth of what NATO can do on defence. I work very closely with Secretary General Rasmussen. I attend NATO foreign minister and defence minister meetings; he attends our meetings of defence ministers which I chair. We are both determined to bring theEuropean Union and NATO closer through a very pragmatic step-by-step approach. We have close staff-to-staff cooperation, including on Pooling & Sharing and on Smart Defence. After all, the capabilities that are developed by EU MemberStates ultimately benefit both the European Union and NATO.

And we are committed more than anything to thisTransatlantic Partnership, and committed to taking on responsibility and being a reliable and international player.

For the European Union, 2013 is the year of "Defence matters."

Our Council President Herman van Rompuy has put the issue on the agenda of the December European Council of Heads of state and government. It will be their opportunity to discuss priorities for future investment; how we procure equipment; the strengthening our industrial base; and how we remain competitive and innovative; and finally, the preparation and availability of our forces.

Closer cooperation in a field as sensitive as defence is challenging. It's challenging, and it's absolutely necessary. In an age when cooperation and coordination are what makes a difference in terms of our security, I believe more than anything that our transatlantic relationship has never been more important.

Thank you.

I would like to thank Eamon Gilmore and all of his staff for their hospitality and the excellent organisation of this Gymnich meeting.

We've had a very productive two days. As you know, we have begun with a discussion on the terrible situation in Syria and from the remarks that I have put out yesterday you will see how united the European Union is in the need to find a political solution to end the bloodshed in Syria and to support the people into the future they aspire to.

We have reiterated very strongly our support for efforts by the international community, including the EU, to achieve this, and we will continue to reach out to all concerned to give new momentum to such a political solution.

Of course we are looking at how to increase assistance to the moderate Syrian opposition, in particular through political and economic support and we continue to put as much pressure as we can on the regime and to increase that pressure to participate in a meaningful political process in line with the Geneva Communique.

Everyone is aware that we have to review our sanctions package by 1 June. So, in the coming weeks this will be an opportunity to examine all options to achieve the EU’s goals.

Following our discussions here in Dublin, I have asked for discussions to continue in all the relevant groups of the Council in Brussels over these coming weeks.

We have a real sense of urgency about the situation in Syria and in the neighbouring countries.

When I met with Brigadier General Idriss last week from the Free Syrian Army, we discussed the kind of support that he needed in the context of what we have said about technical assistance and non-lethal support. We are looking all the time to try and make sure that our humanitarian aid is getting through, in the situation where the numbers of refugees inside and outside the country are growing by thousands every day. So, you should understand the real sense of urgency there to try and find ways that we can ensure some political process. Because that is what everyone agrees is going to be needed to solve this, to stop the killing and to move the country forward. Within that context, Member States want to talk about all possible options. The focus has been perhaps on one of those. But if you were in the room you would have heard many contributions about what we can do and how we can do more. Working with Mr. Brahimi, working with Sheikh Al-Khatib, looking at how to support the UN, looking at ways in which we can work with the countries of Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon and you have seen the situation in Lebanon today. So please put it in that context that this is about making sure that we keep reviewing and looking at how we believe we can best go forward. What was clear from everybody is that there has to be a political solution. The issue is how to help get that and that is why Member States need to keep this debate moving forward, alive and real and discussing the situation as it unfolds.

The objective we have is a political solution: to stop the killing, to get humanitarian aid to people as quickly and effectively as possible. All of you will have been witnessing and some of you through your media are drawing attention every day to the plight of the people and especially the children in Syria. So it's important that people understand how much needs to be done. In order to do that, the sanctions are one part of it, but there are a lot of different things we have to do. We have to constantly look at our sanctions to make sure that we are able to support the people as effectively as we possibly can. And that means reviewing every day to ensure that we offer the best possible support that we can to the people. But I say again that the sanctions regime is one part of this. The real challenge is how do we get a political solution that is going to be necessary that will enable the fighting to stop, the killing to stop and people to be able to start picking up the pieces of their lives and their country with our help to try and get into the future. And all efforts on that are so important right now. The situation is moving quickly, is extraordinarily fragile in my view, especially when you look at so many people who are now displaced, now coming across into other countries, where those countries themselves are going to need more and more help. We really have to increase the efforts that are already under way to try to get to that point.

You also know that we have had a detailed and very constructive discussion on the EEAS review which I am leading. We have been building on a number of different papers which I am very grateful to Member States for circulating beforehand.

We were delighted to welcome Elmar Brok, the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, and Vice-President Maros Sefcovic from the Commission.

Their contributions were extremely valuable in our discussions. I have to say that all interventions were very supportive of the work of the new service and the progress made in the two years since it came into existence.

Those supportive remarks were also echoed by the parliament whose draft report on the review was discussed in the committee on Thursday.

Inevitably and rightly we looked at a number of suggestions on how to improve the effectiveness of the new service, looking at the internal organisation, relations with the other institutions and cooperation on the ground between our delegations and Member States' embassies.

Based on these different inputs, I will produce a paper, as foreseen by the decision we took when we set up the service, in July.

There are different aspects to the review in terms of what we want to achieve but I think that the most important reforms are about ensuring that when we look back, that we have the right interinstitutional framework. And by that I mean that you always have to be certain that you have got a relationship with all the institutions that enable the foreign policy to develop and grow.

In terms of what is happening with the Iran talks, I have had the reports back from the technical discussions. Their objective as you know is simply to be able to show nuclear physicist to nuclear physicist exactly what our proposals are talking about. They are not political negotiations. They are about explanation so that when we meet again in Almaty we can be confident that we have explained in detail what we are proposing to Iran and hope that Iran will come forward with a positive answer to those proposals. I am not going to comment on what comes out of Teheran by way of statements. My experience is to work with the Iranians when we meet, to work with them on the specifics and to of course seek the diplomatic solution.