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Analyses stratégiques, de sécurité et de défense

Mardi 14 mai 2013 2 14 /05 /Mai /2013 12:36

  New Report Calls for Stronger U.S. Manufacturing Sector to Protect National Security.

Urgent action is needed to reduce the U.S. military’s dangerous dependence on foreign suppliers for the raw materials, parts, and finished products needed to defend America, according to a new study prepared by Brigadier General John Adams (U.S. Army, Retired).

FACT SHEET.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

Remaking American Security: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities & National Security Risks Across the U.S. Defense Industrial Base was authored by Guardian Six Consulting President Brigadier General John Adams and released today at a Capitol Hill event led by Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), Rep. Mo Brooks (R-Ala.), and Rep. Tim Ryan (D-Ohio).

The report finds that U.S. national security and the health of the nation’s defense industrial base are in jeopardy because of an over-reliance on foreign suppliers for critical defense materials. Foreign sourcing puts America’s military readiness in the hands of potentially unreliable supplier nations and undermines the ability to develop capabilities needed to win on future battlefields.  The report calls for action to increase domestic production of the natural resources and manufactured goods necessary to equip our military.

“America’s vulnerability today is frightening,” said General Adams. “This report is a wake-up call for America to pay attention to the growing threat posed by the steady deterioration of our defense industrial base. Excessive and unwise outsourcing of American manufacturing to other nations weakens America’s military capability. As a soldier, I’ve witnessed firsthand the importance of our nation’s ability to rapidly produce and field a sophisticated array of capabilities. There is a real risk that supply chain vulnerabilities will hamper our response to future threats.”  

Examples analyzed in detail in the report include:

•    The United States is completely dependent on a single Chinese company for the chemical needed to produce the solid rocket fuel used to propel HELLFIRE missiles. As current U.S. supplies diminish, our military will be reliant on the Chinese supplier to provide this critical chemical—butanetriol—in the quantities needed to maintain this missile system. HELLFIRE missiles are a widely used, reliable, and effective weapon launched from attack helicopters and unmanned drones. They are a critical component in America’s arsenal.

•    The commercialization of rechargeable batteries has moved offshore along with new innovation capacity. Lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries are built on complex chemistries that offer supe¬rior weight savings per unit of energy density. They last a long time during disuse and are low-maintenance. Although the original invention of the Li-ion battery took place in U.S. labora¬tories housed in U.S. universities funded by the federal government, the United States is now at a competitive disadvantage, relying on foreign suppliers for both current products and next generation batteries.   

•    The United States imports 91 percent of the rare earth element lanthanum, which is needed to make night-vision devices, from China. This near-total dependence creates a risk that China could withhold access to lanthanum to force up the price, inhibit a U.S. technological advantage, pressure the United States to resolve disputes on terms favorable to China, or worse, completely withhold supplies. Night-vision devices give U.S. warfighters a critical advantage in low-light operations, such as the night raid that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden.

•    Production of high-tech magnets has migrated offshore, even though American research initially developed this important technology. Today, there is no domestic Neodymium-Iron-Boron (NdFeB) magnet producer, and 75 percent of NdFeB magnets are fabricated in China. The disappearance of a U.S. magnet industry has eroded U.S. leadership in patents and our ability to design new applications.

President of the Alliance for American Manufacturing (AAM) Scott Paul, whose organization commissioned the report, notes that the report is call to action for a renewed focus on American manufacturing capacity.

“Allowing our defense industrial base to keep shrinking and our dependence on foreign manufactures to keep growing will make America weaker, less secure, and less safe,” Paul said.  “As the U.S. pivots its defense posture to focus on Asia, procurement policies that allow, or in some cases encourage, sourcing of critical defense materials from China and other potentially unreliable suppliers don’t make sense. Self-reliance has always been an American virtue and the key to our nation’s success and prosperity. Manufacturing is important for job creation and a strong economy, and it’s also essential for our national security.”
 
The report includes 10 recommendations to foster domestic manufacturing capacity and make the U.S. military less dependent on imported products:

•    Increasing long-term federal investment in high-technology industries, particularly those involving advanced research and manufacturing capabilities;

•    Properly updating, applying, and enforcing existing laws and regulations to support the U.S. defense industrial base;  
•    Developing domestic sources of key natural resources that our armed forces require;  

•    Ensuring that defense industrial base concerns are considered at the highest levels when formulating the U.S. National Military Strategy, National Security Strategy and throughout the Quadrennial Defense Review process;  

•    Building consensus among government, industry, the defense industrial base workforce, and the military on the best ways to strengthen the defense industrial base;

•    Increasing cooperation between federal agencies and between government and industry to build a healthier defense industrial base;

•    Strengthening collaboration between government, industry, and academic research institutions to educate, train, and retain people with specialized skills to work in key defense industrial base sectors;

•    Crafting legislation to support a broadly representative defense industrial base strategy;    

•    Modernizing and securing defense supply chains through networked operations that provide ongoing communications between prime contractors and the supply chains they depend on; and

•    Identifying potential defense supply chain chokepoints and planning to prevent disruptions.

In the coming weeks, Gen. Adams and other national security experts will convene a series of events designed to raise awareness about the risks to our defense supply chain. These events, along with government and industry initiatives, will accelerate the process of restoring the health of the U.S. defense industrial base, as well as restoring American leadership in the critical advanced technologies our armed forces need to win on future battlefields.

 

Source : http://americanmanufacturing.org/press-releases/report-says-us-military-dangerously-dependent-foreign-suppliers

 

See also :

* Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (DoD - January 2012)

 * EU-US Joint Statement on supply-chain security (Brussels, 23 Juny 2011)

 

Par De La Boisserie - Publié dans : Analyses stratégiques, de sécurité et de défense
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Dimanche 28 avril 2013 7 28 /04 /Avr /2013 17:29
   

Executive Summary

The National Intelligence Council in its new report,Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, argues that the historic moment the Obama Administration now confronts “recalls past transition points–such as 1815, 1919, 1945, and 1989–when the path forward was not clear-cut and the world faced the possibility of different global futures.”

The Atlantic Council report that follows, Envisioning 2030: US Strategy for a Post-Western World, agrees with the NIC’s premise that the period we are entering is of a historic significance that has not yet been widely recognized nor acted upon. However, this report also goes a step further, given the NIC’s mandate that limits it from making policy recommendations. It outlines a US leadership strategy for the period ahead and offers policy approaches in key subject areas to ensure a more positive outcome.

We are approaching an inflection point that could lead to a future of vast economic and political volatility, environmental catastrophe, and conflicting, inwardlooking nationalisms that would be unlike any period that the United States has seen before. Alternatively, we could create a more cooperative, rules-based world of reduced poverty and human advancement. More likely, we may face countless variations in between. As has been the case at such historic moments previously, it will be human agency–how key actors, and most importantly the United States–adapt and respond to dynamic global trends that will determine whether we can avoid the worst and achieve the best.

What’s required is a shift in US strategy and a new “mental map.” The United States–unlike other great powers in history–has a second chance at molding the international system to secure its long-term interests.

No other nation is likely to have as much impact in influencing the global future. Yet in a more complex and competitive world, the US margin of error is smaller, while the opportunity to lead remains due to the country’s unique assets and the lack of any power or set of powers that is able and willing to replace it.

Considering the host of challenges the Obama Administration currently faces, this report surveys the emerging economic and geopolitical landscape; it describes the unprecedented policy challenges that landscape presents; and it outlines a US strategy to avoid a zero-sum, conflictual future and move toward a more cooperative and prosperous 2030. What emerges from this report are the following six elements of strategy for President Obama:

1. Frame second-term policies from a more strategic and long-term perspective, recognizing the magnitude of the moment and the likelihood that the United States’ actions now will have generational consequences.

• President Obama should map directions that recognize that the scale and rapidity of change the world will face over the next two decades may be without historic precedent. Thus, policy actions should reflect longer-term goals, and not just be aimed at achievements within the next four years, as President Obama will be setting the tone and direction for “US policy in a post-Western world.”

• The context will be a new and growing array of global challenges, which include further integrating China and other emerging powers into the global order as wealth shifts from west to east; environmental threats and the need to ensure energy, water, and food resources; and demographic patterns that will double the size of the global middle class, offering potential support for Western values, but at the same time greatly increasing political and resource demands.

• The United States is entering not only into a post-Western world but also, in many respects, a post-Westphalian global system in which the nation state will play a less dominant role among a host of new non-state actors, networks and super-empowered individuals.

2. Continue to emphasize what has been called “nation-building at home” as the first foreign policy priority, without neglecting its global context.

• President Obama has been right to emphasize “nation-building at home,” for the revitalization of US economic strength and innovation will be the irreplaceable foundation of any sustainable international strategy. This will not only increase US confidence and capabilities in managing global issues, but it could help restore as a model the American democratic and free market system.

• The most immediate, fundamental requirement to ensure US global influence must be a reversal of the current trajectory of rising deficits and debt, and addressing the political factors that have contributed to it.

• If this can be achieved, the United States is positioned for a significant rebound due to: the improved health of financial institutions; reduced household debt, increased individual savings, undervalued housing prices; the wide-ranging benefits of a domestic shale gas and oil extraction revolution; increased investments in advanced manufacturing; and the potential impact, if unleashed by removing economic uncertainties, of $2 trillion in available corporate cash.

3. Recognize that the United States must energetically act to shape dynamic, uncertain global trends, or it will be shaped unfavorably by them.

• The status quo or “stability” approach is not viable.

The United States must lead, and it must do so actively, vigorously, and strategically.

• If the United States does not do so–if it holds back, withdraws, or remains “status quo” oriented–then it is more likely that the negative outcomes portrayed in the NIC report will come to fruition, with severe consequences for the world more broadly but for the United States in particular. The United States will be damaged greatly if it does not act now to renew its leadership in the international arena for the long term.

4. The United States must pursue more collaborative forms of leadership through deepening current alliances and interacting more effectively with a diverse set of actors to meet the challenges and opportunities of the dramatically changing times.

• Amidst a growing diffusion of power, mobilizing cooperative action tailored to each problem or situation will be crucial. In order to do so effectively, however, US strategy must begin with better leveraging and anchoring existing alliances and partnerships.

• The United States and the European Union remain the world’s two largest economies, and NATO is a unique multilateral institution and proven security actor. Thus the United States should seek ways to reinvigorate both relationships through expanded economic agreements with Europe and the widening and deepening of NATO’s global partnerships.

• At the same time, US alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, and its partnership with Singapore, will be crucial in maintaining an Asian balance of power over the coming generation.

• The United States must develop new arrangements with emerging partners, including a wide range of newly emergent non-state actors.

5. US strategy to 2030 must deepen cooperation with China as the most crucial single factor that will shape th international system in 2030.

• On a broad array of global issues–the shape of multilateral institutions, the global financial system, the nuclear future, cyber security, outer space, climate change, global resource scarcities, and Asian security–the US-China relationship will be a major driver of solutions or of failure.

• Interdependence gives the United States and China a compelling and direct interest in the economic success of the other, but the two countries must more assertively work to avoid the historic pattern of a rising power posing a strategic threat to the status quo. Such conflict would be catastrophic for the world, as zero-sum behavior and conflict would be difficult to avoid.

• The myriad issues fueling recently increased mutual distrust suggests that achieving a modus vivendi will be a difficult and protracted process.

6. US leaders must more creatively address the locus of instability in the 21st century—the greater Middle East from North Africa to Pakistan—a major threat to US strategy and world order.

• If efforts in the Middle East and North Africa fail, the threats posed to international order—from nuclear-armed regional powers, failed nuclear states, and terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction–could lead to unprecedented destruction and vast instability across a broad swath of the earth.

• The Arab awakening will, in most cases, result in volatile, Islamist-oriented governments over the rest of this decade. Their futures will depend largely on whether elected governments demonstrate work toward good governance and economic growth.

• US strategy can help catalyze the right outcome—Arab efforts to realize economic modernization and stable political pluralism—by understanding that this is fundamentally an internally-driven process of change and being aware of its limits as well as its opportunities.

• A coordinated US, EU, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) approach to work with international financial institutions could develop an incentive structure mixing aid, debt relief, and conditioned grants or loans to help foster market-oriented reforms. The GCC and Turkey could play acatalytic role in encouraging a MENA customs union and perhaps adoption of a common currency.

The United States in 2012 is still accustomed to be being the world’s dominant superpower. Since the end of the Cold War, even as relative US power has declined, the United States still has fared extraordinarily well in reaping the benefits of an international order that was largely designed in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

In light of the vast changes sweeping the world between now and 2030, the United States must redesign and renew its approach to the world along the lines outlined above. If US leaders fail to do so, both the United States and the world will pay a heavy price.

The stakes are high for getting US strategy right for a post-Western world.

Read the report : Envisioning2030 web Envisioning2030 web

 

Par Patrice Cardot - Publié dans : Analyses stratégiques, de sécurité et de défense
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Samedi 13 avril 2013 6 13 /04 /Avr /2013 11:14
 

 

 

Two recent publications on the UK
about its role in Europe and its defence industry

 

 

Description: Description: IFRI_thd_couvukeu.jpgVivien Pertusot, “In Europe, Not Ruled by Europe: Tough Love between Britain and the EU”, Note de l’Ifri, March 2013

In a new study published by the French Institute for International Relations (Ifri), Vivien Pertusot, head of Ifri’s office in Brussels, argues that a potential “Brexit”, the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, has become a genuine possibility. He aims at better understanding the underlying reasons driving the debate as well as potential scenarios on how the situation could develop. “The gap is widening between the UK and the EU and that balance was sustainable as long as the EU had little prerogatives on economic, fiscal, and monetary policies”, Pertusot says. “Today, the more the Eurozone countries, and most others, get closer together, the more that balance is strained.” The study explores three scenarios: Britain remaining a full member, Britain becoming an associate member, and Britain leaving the EU. The UK debate is interesting for the future of Europe, because it could act as the incubator which spreads such ideas to other parts of the Union.

Download the report and its executive summary. You can also watch a video presentation.

 

Description: Description: IFRI_thd_capturecouvertureDefenceReform.jpgJohn Louth, “Defence Reform in the UK: A Twenty-First Century Paradox”, Focus stratégique No. 43, March 2013

The context of budgetary constraint offered a strong incentive for the 2010 Coalition Government to improve its management of defence equipment. Before that, the previous Labour governments already focused on “smart acquisition” so that the procurement process could reach a trade-off between military performance, the R&D costs and the purchase value. Thus, several “smart acquisition” reforms aimed at importing private sector skills and behaviours into the defence public domain. By building its logic around public-private partnership (PPP), “smart acquisition” can be apprehended as an interlocking of three factors: organisation, the high level of process and body of knowledge, and the people who promoted and enacted its processes, behaviours and objectives. Due to organisational confusion, ineffective project management and unclear objectives, successive UK governments have failed to manage operational and financial risks, cost overruns and diseconomies. As John Louth says, “Defence – and the acquisition of defence capabilities from myriad partners and providers – is a far from simple practice where a readiness to tolerate both uncertainty and failure is not just desirable but essential”.

Download the report.

 

Also by Ifri on the UK:

Charlotte Trébuchet, “The electricity power mix in the UK”, Note de l’Ifri, November 2012. Download the report.

 

 

Next event: Brussels Think Tank Dialogue - April 22, 2013, Brussels

For the fourth time, ten think tanks join forces to tackle some EU challenges: energy policy, growth, and EU's place in the world. Think tank representatives, including Ifri, will make recommendations and will confront their views with practitioners.

Special guests: Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council, José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission and Thierry de Montbrial, Founder and President of Ifri.

More information and registration online.

 

 

All publications are available at: www.ifri.org

 

Description: cid:8A34AF1DA3992FDC25573F971A33356E@eurifri.be Description: cid:E3403618135A8BFCD83F3CEEC6E3D18A@eurifri.be

 

Contact Ifri Brussels: Eva Vaudolon, +32 (0)2 238 5110, vaudolon@ifri.org

.

 

We observe the law of December 8th 1992 on the protection of privacy.

If you want to see, change or remove your personal details, please send an e-mail to bruxelles@ifri.org

 

Par ERASME - Publié dans : Analyses stratégiques, de sécurité et de défense
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Mardi 2 avril 2013 2 02 /04 /Avr /2013 13:11
The Defense Research Unit has just released a new paper in English:
 
Focus stratégique No. 43

 Defence Reform in the United Kingdom:
A Twenty-First Century Paradox

     by John Louth

Access and download this article at:

 

The context of budgetary constraint offered a strong incentive for the 2010 Coalition Government to improve its management of defence equipment. Before that, the previous Labour governments already focused on smart acquisition so that the procurement process could reach a trade-off between military performance, the R&D costs and the purchase value. Thus, several smart acquisition reforms aimed at importing private sector skills and behaviours into the defence public domain. By building its logic around public-private partnership (PPP), smart acquisition can be apprehended as an interlocking of three factors: organisation, the high level of process and body of knowledge, and the people who promoted and enacted its processes, behaviours and objectives. Due to organisational confusion, ineffective project management and unclear objectives, successive UK governments have failed to manage operational and financial risks, cost overruns and diseconomies.              

Dr. John Louth is Senior Research Fellow and Director for Defence, Industries and Society at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. His work has included the audit and governance of the UK strategic deterrent, the implementation of risk-based governance regimes into energy businesses, UK Ministry of Defence and industry partnering initiatives. He spent part of his career in the Middle East running separate national programmes to develop commercial and defence capabilities across a number of Gulf States. Dr Louth has also worked as a senior adviser to the European Defence Agency on the development of pan-European procurement policies and practices. He teaches at Roehampton University Business School in London and is also a specialist adviser to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee.                
 
Bringing together researchers from the Security Studies Center and outside experts, the “Focus stratégique” series alternates articles on general security issues with more specialized analyses carried out by the team of the Defense Research Unit (LRD or Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense).
Par Dujardin Jean - Publié dans : Analyses stratégiques, de sécurité et de défense
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Vendredi 22 mars 2013 5 22 /03 /Mars /2013 11:19

L’année 2012 constitue un tournant qui permet de mieux comprendre la réorientation stratégique américaine. Pour la première fois, les dépenses en matière de défense en Asie (287 milliards de dollars) ont excédé, en valeur nominale, ceux des États européens membres de l’OTAN. Dans son rapport annuel « The Military Balance 2012 », l'International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) souligne que ce bouleversement « n'est pas simplement le résultat d’une Asie qui dépense plus, il est autant le résultat d'États en Europe qui dépensent moins ». Une réduction drastique des dépenses qui est d’ailleurs souvent conduite « en fonction des priorités financières immédiates », sans améliorations de l’efficacité des armées et sans coordination entre les États, malgré la volonté affichée de faire « plus avec moins ».

En valeur réelle, les dépenses européennes n’atteignent même plus aujourd’hui le niveau de 2006. Elles sont inférieures de 11 %. « Cette réduction continue de façonner les capacités militaires et en particulier au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Allemagne, en Italie et en Espagne qui représentent près de 70 % des dépenses européennes », note le rapport, publié le 14 mars. Cela s’est notamment traduit par une réduction du nombre de soldats, qui est passé en Europe de 2,51 millions en 2000 à 1,86 million aujourd’hui, soit une baisse de 25 %. C’est une baisse qui n’a pas produit en même temps les effets escomptés : « L'intention était qu’un nombre réduit, lorsqu'il est combiné avec des réformes structurelles, produise une augmentation de l'employabilité des forces armées, mais dans de nombreux pays européens, cela ne s'est pas produit ».

L’opération française au Mali n’a fait que confirmer les lacunes capacitaires déjà apparues au cours de l’intervention de l’OTAN en Libye en 2011, observe aussi l’IISS. Le ravitaillement en vol, le transport aérien et les capacités de renseignement et de surveillance en sont les exemples les plus emblématiques. Les initiatives de partage et de mutualisation sont-elles une réponse adéquate ? Peut-être, mais presque rien ne permet de le prouver, car « les progrès vers une meilleure coopération restent limités, les capitales nationales étant préoccupées par la perte de la souveraineté et de l'emploi ».

Les dépenses totales en Asie, qui ont augmenté de presque 5 % en 2012, sont surtout tirées vers le haut par la Chine, où la hausse a été de 8,3 %. Selon l’IISS, on y assiste à une course aux armements, nourrie par les tensions diplomatiques. Cette tendance devrait se confirmer pour 2013, le gouvernement chinois ayant déjà annoncé qu’il dépensera 10,7 % en plus que l’année précédente. Le rattrapage technologique de la Chine s’accentue chaque année, car sa capacité « à produire des équipements de pointe transforme peu à peu l’Armée populaire de Libération ». À ce rythme, les dépenses militaires de la Chine pourraient atteindre le niveau de celles des États-Unis en 2025.

Source : Edition n° 594 d' EUROPE, DIPLOMATIE &DEFENSE en date du 21mars 2013

Voir également :

La France demeure 4ème exportateur mondial d’armement mais est désormais talonnée par la Chine 

* « Il faudra donc des efforts sur tous les bancs pour que nos armées aient les moyens de leurs ambitions. » Bernard Cazeneuve     

 

Par De La Boisserie - Publié dans : Analyses stratégiques, de sécurité et de défense
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